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COMMODITIES REGULATION
THE PROPOSED SUITABILITY STANDARDS FOR THE
COMMODITY INDUSTRY: "RIGHT CHURCH, WRONG PEW"
GEORGE J. SOTOS*
KEVIN F. BOWEN**
"When do I get my first dividend check?" This question is often asked
by newcomers to commodities trading. New traders frequently have much to
learn of the how and why of commodities markets since their frame of
reference has been defined by trading in securities. Because there are many
misleading similarities about the two areas, new traders may enter the world
of commodities futures trading unaware of the risks involved. The standards
which will be used to determine the appropriateness of commodities trading,
particularly for these new customers, are among the stated concerns of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission I and the subject of this article.
This article is not, therefore, a survey of developments in commodities
law in the past year, 2 but an analysis of some steps taken to implement one
aspect of the new law regulating the commodities industry, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.1 The enactment of the CFTCA is
the most important development in the commodities law area since com-
modities trading began. Because Chicago is the major center of trading in
commodities the courts in this circuit will play a prominent role in defining
* Associate in firm of Moses, Gibbons, Abramson & Fox; member of the Illinois Bar;
J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
** Assistant State's Attorney for DuPage County; member of the Illinois Bar; J.D.,
Northwestern University School of Law.
1. The Commission was established under the authority of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-22 (Supp. IV). The Commission will be
hereinafter referred to in the text as the CFTC or the Commission.
2. In fact, only one case was decided in the Seventh Circuit under the new law in the past
year. American Int'l Trading Co. v. Bagley, 536 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1976). That case involved an
action by the International Trading Company to enjoin the CFTC from contacting certain of its
customers during the course of an investigation being conducted by the CFTC. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the order of the district court entering an injunction
prohibiting the use of a customer list for interview purposes. The court found that:
If there be a legitimate purpose to which the investigation is pertinent, if the agency
does not have the information sought and the formal administrative steps provided in
its creative Act have been followed, then courts should not intervene in the initial
determinations; they are for the agency to decide at this stage of the inquiry.
Id. at 1198.
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-22 (Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the CFTCA or the
Act].
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commodities law in the future. The actions of the CFTC are therefore of
interest not only to participants in the commodities markets, but to lawyers
who advise them and courts which must adjudicate the disputes which arise.
As the Act begins to influence the way the markets operate, the approach
taken by the CFTC in its enforcement of the Act will be of great interest. This
article is intended to contribute to an understanding and analysis of the actions
of the CFTC by critically reviewing one aspect of its work, the proposals for
defining the duties and responsibilities of commodities brokers towards their
new customers.
There is little if any case law which defines the duties and responsibilities
of commodities brokers towards their customers. This absence of reported
decisions creates significant problems for those attorneys advising their
clients who trade or deal in commodities. Recently, however, an advisory
committee of the CFTC has proposed certain "suitability" standards con-
cerning new customers. This article will examine and call into question some
of these standards and offer alternatives. Because analogous rules from
securities regulations have been used in developing those applicable to
commodities, before engaging in a close analysis of the proposed rules a
survey and comparison of the commodities and securities fields will be made.
FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMODITIES MARKETS
In its broadest sense, suitability to engage in commodities transactions
must be examined in light of the types of persons who use the commodities
futures marketplace. By its very nature, the commodities futures market
allows for only two types of participants-the hedger and the speculator. The
futures marketplace works because of the interplay between these two types
of participants.'
The Hedger
The single most important purpose for the futures market is to provide
price insurance to those people who produce or utilize certain fundamental
commodities.' These producers and users are the hedgers in the commodities
market. The financial risk of price change is inherent in the production,
distribution and processing of commodities. The hedger, having an actual
interest in the underlying commodity, enters into a futures transaction to
4. Commodity futures transactions can also be used to effect tax spreads for certain
persons who wish to generate capital losses to offset capital gains. The Committee's suitability
standards are primarily aimed at new customers who take on the speculative role in a com-
modities futures transaction and not the person who effects tax spreads. Suitability standards for
tax spreaders should perhaps be established by the accounting profession or tax counselors, not
the CFTC. This article is confined to a discussion of the new trader who views the commodities
transactions as a substitute for securities trading.
5. S. ANGRIST. SENSIBLE SPECULATING IN COMMODITIES 21 (1972).
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stabilize his profit structure and to reduce his business risk.6 He does so by
buying or selling futures contracts to minimize the effect of inevitable price
change.
7
To understand a hedger's objectives, a classic selling hedge for an
Illinois farmer will be described. In early March of the year, the farmer is
prepared to plant his fields with one of several possible crops. Assume the
farmer can plant either 20,000 bushels of soybeans or 50,000 bushels of corn
on his land. His expectation is to harvest, store and market his product by
year's end. The farmer's choice of which crop to plant is based primarily upon
the selling price of that crop at the time it will be sent to market. This future
selling price is available to the farmer by virtue of the price anticipation
mechanism of the futures marketplace. The farmer can approximate the direct
costs of growing, storing and delivering either of his possible crop choices.
He may know the costs of delivering corn in December at a Chicago area grain
storage elevator are $2.55 per bushel while the costs of delivering soybeans to
the same place at about the same time are $6.70 per bushel. If the futures
prices, as established on the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, are $2.65
per bushel for the December corn contract and $6.75 for the January soybean
contract, the farmer will choose to plant corn. By raising corn the farmer can
not only make a ten cent per bushel profit (five cents more than soybeans) but
he can also deliver two and one half times as many bushels of corn as
soybeans. By utilizing the futures market price quotes, the farmer can make a
choice of crops and can start his spring planting.
From his analysis, the farmer has calculated a potential profit of ten cents
per bushel on corn. However, the price of corn delivered in Chicago in
December may change between the time the farmer plants his crop in March
and the time he delivers it. Besides the possible change in basis,8 the farmer
6. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL 63 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as CBT MANUAL].
7. Id. The hedging definition adopted by the Commission in its rule 1.3(z) states:
These shall mean sales of, or short positions in, any commodity for future delivery
on or subject to the rules of any contract market made or held by any persons to the
extent that such sales or short positions are offset in quantity by the ownership or
fixed-price purchase of the same cash commodity by the same person or, conversely,
purchases of, or long positions in, any commodity for future delivery on or subject to
the rules of any contract market made or held by any person to the extent that such
purchases or long positions are offset by fixed-price sales of the same cash commodity
by the same person.
17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (1976).
8. "Basis" is the difference between the the cash price of a commodity at a particular time
and place and the price of that commodity in the futures market on a given exchange. The basis is
expressed as the arithmetic difference between the cash price and the futures prices being
quoted. The difference is due to several factors including cost of transportation between the
location of the cash commodity and the futures market; supply and demand conditions at the
location of the cash commodity relative to those prevailing at the terminal market(s) where
deliveries are permitted on futures contracts; variations in quality factors between the cash
commodity and contract grade of the commodity in the futures market. CBT MANUAL, supra
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faces the chance that the cash market delivery price of corn in December may
rise, thereby increasing the profits on his enterprise. However, if the price of
cash market corn goes down in December, the farmer may not make a profit
and may even realize a loss. If the farmer does not wish to take the risk of a
possible adverse price change, he will hedge his crop position in the futures
market.
Hedging for the farmer in this example is a relatively simple process. 9 By
contracting to deliver 50,000 bushels of corn in December at $2.65, the
farmer can protect his ten cent per bushel profit margin. If over the term of the
contract the price of corn changes, that fact will be reflected in both the cash
market price and the futures price for corn. Since these prices tend to move in
tandem, the farmer is insuring his cash crop profit position. If corn prices rise,
the profit in the cash position is offset by the loss in the futures contract. On
the other hand, if corn prices go down, the loss in the cash position is offset by
the farmer's gain in the futures. At lower price levels, he is able to deliver
against or offset his December obligation with cheaper corn for which he has
fixed a selling price of $2.65. Regardless of which direction prices move, the
farmer will have set his profit at ten cents per bushel by hedging at $2.65.
While it is true that by hedging the farmer foregoes the possibility of higher
prices and profits, he insures the maintenance of a specified profit margin
which keeps him in business.
The Speculator
In the foregoing example, the hedging farmer effectively shifted the risk
note 6, at 64. Basis was not included in the text example but could easily be added into the
formulation of profits. The following example illustrates a hedge using basis as part of the
formulation:
In March, the farmer looks at the futures prices for wheat to be delivered in
Chicago in July. If his normal basis for July is 15 cents under the Chicago price, and if
July wheat is trading at $4.35 per bushel on March 20, the farmer may decide to hedge
his $4.20 price in the July future on that day. To do so, he sells two contracts (10,000
bushels) of July wheat on the Chicago Board of Trade. The farmer's position looks like
this:
Cash Futures
Mar. 20
growing 10,000 bushels of sells 2 contracts of July
wheat on which price ob- wheat @ $4.35 per bushel
jective is $4.20 per
bushel
Having placed the hedge, the farmer has protected himself against a decline in price. If
prices drop, he will realize a profit on his short futures position that will balance his loss
on his cash wheat. If prices rise, his gain on the selling price in the cash market will be
balanced by a loss on his futures position. In either case, he will realize or exceed his
price objective.
CBT MANUAL, supra note 6, at 69.
9. CBT MANUAL, supra note 6, at 69. For other examples of hedging, see Johnson, The
Changing Face of Commodity Regulation, 20 PRAc. LAW 27, 30, 31 (1974). See also CBT
MANUAL, supra note 6, at 63-76.
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of adverse price movement away from himself. The speculator, on the other
hand, enters into a futures transaction to assume the risk that the hedger wishes
to avoid. Risking his capital for the sake of profiting on a favorable price
movement, the speculator rarely if ever has an interest in the underlying
commodities. Without a volume of speculative trading, the hedgers would be
forced to contend with a "thin" or inactive market among themselves and
their risk-shifting opportunities would be limited. Market liquidity, a vital
economic concern, is insured by the speculator's participation in com-
modities transactions. 10
Commodities speculating is a risky venture. As a condition of trading
speculators post a type of security bond called a margin, "an amount of
money deposited to ensure performance of the terms of the contract (the
delivery or taking of delivery of the commodity or the cancellation of the
position by a subsequent offsetting trade)." 1I The margin amount is set as a
dollar per contract figure which is usually treated as a small percentage of the
value of the futures contract. It is not, however, the payment of equity or
down payment on the commodity itself.12 By posting margin, the speculator
can establish positions in the market worth many times the margin deposit.
This process is called leveraging. Because of this process, commodities
speculators face not only the risk of losing the funds posted as margin, but also
that of losing large amounts of uncommitted capital.
For example, if the margin requirement is $1,250 and corn futures are
selling for $2.50 per bushel, a $1,250 deposit would allow a speculator to "go
long," that is, buy one contract for future delivery of 5,000 bushels of corn
worth $12,500. The "leverage" in this type of trading is that a small deposit
($1,250) controls a large position ($12,500). If the price of corn rises 10% to
$2.75 per bushel, the value of the contract increases $1,250, from $12,500 to
$13,750. If sold, the profit on the contract price is 10%. From his point of
view, however, the speculator has made ten times that profit. For a $1,250
margin deposit the speculator has made an additional $1,250-a profit of
100%.
In the above example, if the price of corn futures had dropped to $2.25
per bushel (to a contract value of $11,250), the speculator would have lost the
full amount of his committed margin. If the price of corn had gone down 20%
to $2.00 per bushel (or $10,000 for the contract), the speculator would have
been called upon to post additional margins to cover the paper loss, because of
the diminished value of the contract. If he had failed to post additional bond or
margin, the speculator would have had his futures positions sold. A sale at
10. CBT MANUAL, supra note 6, at 101.
11. Id. at 280.
12. Id.
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$2.00 per bushel demonstrates the risks of a negative (losing) leverage trade.
At the $2.00 price level, the speculator would have lost more than he
originally posted as margin. Because the trade had been leveraged, the 20%
decrease in price would have brought about a 200% decrease in the
speculator's capital account! The speculator would end up losing the $1,250
margin commitment and owing an additional $1,250.
Positive leveraging is the device which allows the speculator to increase
a relatively small amount of margin capital to significant wealth. Negative
leverage in the usually fast and volatile commodities markets can eliminate
significant wealth and vaporize uncommitted capital in a matter of days or
even hours. The closest theoretical equivalent in the securities market is the
stock margin account. However, the high margin requirements in securities,
continuously regulated by the Federal Reserve Board, are in no sense
comparable to the leverage found in commodities trading. 13 An understand-
ing of the roles played by the speculator and the hedger in a commodities
transaction serves to establish the basic difference from its securities
counterpart.
THE SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES MARKETS COMPARED
While commodities markets provide a forum wherein hedgers can shift
the risk of price change to speculators, securities markets serve as resource
allocators. 14 Both in the initial offering and aftermarket, a company's stock is
being evaluated by the investment community. Generally, prices for stock set
by the market mechanism are related to a company's profitability, anticipated
stream of future earnings and future dividends. 15
13. Currently the Federal Reserve Board policy as administered through regulation T, 12
C.F.R. §§ 220.1-220.129(1976), has set margin for securities purchases at 50% and "short" sales
at 100%, 12 C.F.R. § 220.8 (1976). Most commodities futures purchases or sales can be margined
for the equivalent of 10% less.
14. A well performing capital market will allocate the greatest part or a given volume
of savings to those industries with the greatest prospective rates of return. Savings are
generally channeled to the most productive use by the price mechanism. Since the
price of a company's stock in the second-hand market determines the amount of capital
it can obtain, 'fair price determination' in the stock market is essential to efficient
allocation.
Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the SEC Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260, 264
(1968).
An investor in the securities market has been defined as one who "invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party .... ." SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 299 (1946). One difference between the securities
investor and the commodities futures trader is that the commodities futures trader does not place
his money in a "common enterprise." Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). Another difference is that the profits gained by a
commodities futures trader do not result "solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third party."
This article presupposes that the reader has a basic understanding of the mechanism of the
securities market utilized in buying and selling stocks.
15. A variety of formulae are available to determine fair market value of stocks. Depending
on the expected future growth of the company and capitalization rates employed, different values
are arrived at. However, the basic formulation of present intrinsic value of a share of stock is
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While the securities markets serve to evaluate profitable enterprises,
raise capital and direct it to the most productive uses, commodities markets
serve primarily to preserve hedgers' capital. The prices established on
futures markets indirectly affect hedgers' capital needs. To the extent future
prices signal advantageous or profitable price levels, commodity users and
producers may seek to expand production or increase use of the com-
modities in which they deal. However, unlike the securities markets, the
commodities futures market is not entered into as an alternative capital
market.
A profound and succinct difference between securities and commodities
markets is described by a professional commodities trader as follows:
Commodities trading is what economists term a "zero sum
game." Every dollar lost by any trader is made by another trader
and the only money that leaves the game is the broker's commis-
sion. While any trader may have a "paper profit" the profit and loss
of all traders at all times adds up to zero. This is distinctly different
from the stock market where the total value (and profit) goes up in a
bull market and down in a bear market. The total value of all
commodity futures contracts changes with price movements, but
the total value of winnings will change only as the volume of
business changes.' 6
The purposes, methods and objectives of the securities markets differ
significantly from those of the commodities markets. Equating the two
industries is not only inappropriate, but also misleading to the public as well
dependent upon its future dividends. To the extent dividends are available but not paid, they are
retained and used to build an earnings power base. One way of valuing a share of stock is to
estimate the sum of the company's future dividends and divide that stream of dividends by the
difference between an appropriate capitalization rate and the company's growth factor. This can
be described in algebraic terms as:
Do
Po = K-g
where: Po is the price of the stock today;
Do is the estimate of future dividends;
K is the investor's required rate of return on an
investment with this degree of risk;
g is company's expected growth rate.
J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 297-306 (2d ed. 1966). These formulations of
stock prices have no application in commodities speculation or commodity price forecasting. The
main reason for the difference lies in the fact that commodities and commodity futures contracts
do not generate earnings, much less dividends. The price of commodities futures contracts relate
to the supply and demand factors of the particular commodity being traded. Factors which affect
supply and demand for that commodity will affect its price. For a fuller explanation of
"fundamental" and "technical" trading approaches and economic factors underlying com-
modities price forecasting, see CBT MANUAL, supra note 3, at 79-99. See also T. Hieronymous,
ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING FOR COMMERCIAL AND PERSONAL PROFIT 136-69 (1971).
Of interest is the fact that companies have certain theoretical bases below which their stock
should not trade. Book value per share or the liquidation value of the company per share gives a
guidepost to theinvestor seeking to own shares of a traded company. Such guideposts are not
found in the cash market price relationship to the futures prices.
16. B. GOULD, DOW-JONES-IRWIN GUIDE TO COMMODITIES TRADING 55 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as GOULD].
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as to brokers and regulators who attempt the difficult task of applying
securities concepts to the realities of commodities trading. Moreover, such an
attempt will inevitably mislead the customer, frustrate communication be-
tween the customer and the broker, perhaps lead to otherwise unnecessary
litigation and, most significantly, could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of
essential speculative funds from the commodity marketplace.
THE PROPOSED RULES
Concern for Customers New to Commodities Trading
The Commodities Futures Trading Commission was created by an Act of
Congress known as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974.17 The legislative history of the Act reveals that some of the needs
Congress sought to meet by creating the CFTC were to regulate the com-
modities industry, to prevent market abuses, and to ensure orderly markets. 18
On August 5, 1975, the CFTC established an advisory committee
17. 7 U.S.C § 2-22 (Supp. IV 1974).
18. The Senate Committee in its report on H.R. 13113 analyzed the need for better and
extended regulation in this manner:
The shift to market-oriented economy has brought the general public into the
futures markets in growing numbers. Speculators are attracted to the futures markets
by the wide price swings and the possibility of large profits. Such an increase in
trading by the speculative public, while useful to hedgers, brings with it potential
market problems. If individual speculators or groups operating in concert obtain
control of the futures markets, price manipulation, corners and squeezes can occur,
with adverse effects on producers and consumers alike.
In recent years, the consumer has become increasingly aware that futures markets
have a direct effect on such matters as his grocery bill and the cost of his home.
Properly operating futures markets help to hold down consumer prices by reducing
middleman costs. However, improperly operating futures markets can have the
opposite result. In order to assure that futures markets operate properly and that the
prices consumers pay are not artificially high, careful and efficient supervision of the
markets is essential.
It is apparent that a regulatory agency cannot be expected to oversee the rapidly
expanding and complex futures markets without additional tools with which to do thejob and proper organization and funding. In addition to providing the tools that the
regulatory body would need in preventing violations and disciplining violators directly,
its role in supervising exchanges must be substantially expanded. Unquestionably,
exchanges are going to have to perform their regulatory role better in order to provide a
viable market in which the public can have confidence. The Federal regulatory agency
must be given the authority to require that exchanges do so.
S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1974). The Act is designed to insure fair
practices and honest dealings on the commodity exchanges and to provide a measure of control
over those forms of speculative activity which often demoralize the markets to the injury of
producers, consumers and the exchanges themselves. S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
2-27 (1974).
Early government regulation sought to protect farm interests from unscrupulous specula-
tors who profited at the expense of grain growers. The Grain Futures Act of 1922, Ch. 369, § 1,
42 Stat. 998 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-12 (Supp. IV 1974)), required licensing of grain
markets as one manner of preventing abuse. In 1936 Congress amended the Grain Futures Act
by the Commodity Exchange Act, which established several new licensing requirements for
futures commission merchants (FCMs) and floor brokers. Commodity Exchange Act, Ch. 545,
§ 5, 49 Stat. 1494-95 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d & 6e (Supp. IV 1974)). For a more
detailed discussion of the history of the regulation of commodities markets, see Note, The
Commodities Game Has a New Referee, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 443-44 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as The Commodities Game].
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program comprised of four separate Advisory Committees, each of limited
duration. One such committee was the advisory committee on Commodity
Futures Trading Professionals. 19 The Commission stated that the Committee
would be asked to consider and submit reports and recommendations on the
standards for regulation of domestic and foreign commodity futures trading
professionals, including futures commission merchants.2"
In recent years, the ranks of commodity speculators have swelled with
novice traders who came to the commodities market seeking an alternative to
stock trading. Lured by tales of spectacular profits, low margins and over-
night millionaires, uninformed investors began speculating in bellies and
bushels, unaware of the sobering risks inherent in the mechanics of commodi-
ty trading. 2' The Committee formed its overall recommendations to meet
19. 40 Fed. Reg. 32,866 (1975).
20. Id. Included in the category of commodity futures trading professionals are commodity
trading advisors, commodity pool operators, futures commission merchants, persons associated
therewith and floor brokers. Each of these persons has been specially defined in section 2(a)(1) of
the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1974). The Committee's report was published only in a special
edition of the Commodities Futures Law Reporter, 29 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING PROFESSIONALS (August 20, 1976, Part II) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT].
21. The comparisons between commodities and securities trading have been ably set forth
in a recent publication:
Similarities between stocks and commodities can be misleading. The public trader
does business through brokerage houses, such as E. F. Hutton or Merrill Lynch in both
cases, and often the same broker will handle both stocks and commodities. Both
brokers will give out tips, brochures, and a dry shoulder when needed. Both brokers
will service an established account by phone. Both brokers will take your money.
Margin accounts appear to be about the same in function but much lower for
commodities; in fact they are entirely different. Both feature nearly instantaneous
ticker reporting and any good newspaper will give quotations of daily price movements
for both in the same manner. Many of the terms used in one market mean the same
thing in the other.
Here are some terms which are used in both stock and commodity trading:
(Commodities) (Securities)
Job lot odd lot
Leverage same
Limited order same
Long same
Margin (good faith) in true sense
Market order same
Net position same
Offer ask
On opening same
Open interest float
Open order same
Opening, the same
Opening price same
Pit floor
Point same
Position same
Price averaging same
Privileges same
Pyramiding same
Quotations similar
Range same
Seasonals stock cycles
Short same
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what it felt was the public's lack of information about, and often misunder-
standing, of commodity futures markets.22 However, the specific group of
greatest apparent concern to the Committee was that class of customer new to
commodities markets.
The Committee sought to protect new customers by compelling futures
professionals including futures commission merchants to prepare a risk
disclosure statement.23 As further protection the Committee recommended the
establishment of a "know-your-customer" rule and suitability standards for
adoption in the commodity industry. 24 Apparently it was thought that these
regulations, among others, would help safeguard the new commodities trader
against the substantial risk of loss inherent in futures trading. 25
Spread arbitrage
Stop-loss order same
Straddle arbitrage
Scalper specialist
Tape same
Technical rally same
Technicals same
Volume same
Ask same
At the market same
Bear same
Bid same
Break same
Bull same
Buy on close same
Buy on opening same
Cash commodity no comparison
[CFTC] SEC
Close, the same
Closing price same
Cover (liquidation) same
Day order same
Evening up same
Fundamentals same
Hedge same principle
These many similarities in the handling of commodity and stock accounts can lead to the
false impression that the two games are played the same way. While the mechanics of trading are
much alike, the strategy of play is much different. GOULD, supra note 13, at 51. The similarity in
the legislator's mind is evidenced by the statements of the Chairman of the Conference
Committee which considered the bill. Chairman Herman Talmadge stated: "I believe the
legislation we are now considering will be considered landmark legislation in the future. It creates
an agency comparable in stature and responsibility to the Securities and Exchange Commission."
Statement by Chairman Talmadge on Consideration of the Conference Report on H.R. 13113
(October 19, 1974).
22. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 1, 2. The Committee also noted that
the public's lack of understanding and misunderstanding and low confidence in futures markets
is:
exacerbated by inevitable comparisons to the securities industry-which has benefited
from the 40-year presence of a vigorous independent regulatory agency, an active
self-regulatory association, a dominant exchange and federal insurance of brokerage
accounts. None of these benefits-which are important to the public's perception of an
industry-has been available to the commodities industry.
See also note 21 supra for misleading similarities between commodities and securities trading.
23. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.
24. Id. at 10-11.
25. Id. at I.
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Proposed Customer Protection
The Committee suggested the following rules:
1. Disclosure. FCM's must be required to furnish each new
commodities customer with a clear and concise written statement
(preferably one page) explaining the risks inherent in commodity
futures trading, particularly the risk to uncommitted capital. The
FCM should be required promptly to obtain from the customer a
written acknowledgement that he has received the risk disclosure
document .... 26
2. Know your customer. An FCM must have a continuing
general knowledge of each customer, inluding his overall financial
situation, trading objectives and suitability to engage in futures
trading .... 27
3. Suitability. An FCM must have a reasonable ground for
believing that each recommendation made by it to a customer is
suitable in light of the customer's financial condition, objectives,
etc.....28
4. Required minimums. The CFTC should not establish a
minimum net worth requirement that a customer must meet in order
to maintain an account with an FCM .... 29
It is apparent from the proposed rules and the Committee's discussion
underlying each recommendation 30 that the commodities broker is being
made to assume the added responsibilities of a customer's financial analyst
and advisor. FCM's will be required to ascertain the prospective customer's
financial and personal situations, make recommendations suited to each
individual's trading propensity and continuously investigate the propriety of a
customer's continued trading on the commodities futures markets.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id. at 11.
29. Id.
30. The following is a part of the full discussion underlying some of the Committee's
recommendations:
Know your customer. Commission Rule 1.37 which requires FCM's to ascertain
the name, address and occupation of each account-holder, must be broadened to
require FCM's to obtain from each customer complete information as to his income,
net worth, number of dependents, etc. . . . The FCM's duty to know his customer
must be a continuing one. A customer's financial situation and capacity for risk-
taking may change from what it was when he opened the account. FCM's should
know their customers not only for the purpose of making suitable recommendations
but also to avoid situations in which a defaulting customer might jeopardize the entire
firm and its other customers. ...
Suitability. Suitability is of particular importance in commodities trading because
of the wide varieties of trading programs that are available to customers. For example,
a series of spread trades may be appropriate for a conservative trader whereas an
aggressive program of speculation in a volatile contract may be entirely
unsuitable. ...
Required minimums. A customer's suitability to trade futures does not depend on
his net worth. First, there are many different kinds of trading programs in which a
customer may engage-ranging from the highly conservative to the very aggres-
sive. Second, net worth is only one element of a customer's capacity for risk-taking; an
individual with a relatively small net worth but high income and few dependents is
probably more suited to futures trading than an individual with a higher net worth but
relatively low income and several dependents. . ..
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 10-11.
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What has occurred, obviously, is that the Committee proposes to
incorporate into commodities law the doctrines of "know-your-customer"
and "suitability" originally developed in securities law. However, because
of the difference between securities and commodities trading, the application
of the securities law doctrines is inappropriate to commodities law.
THE SECURITIES LAW SUITABILITY DOCTRINE AND ITS
POSSIBLE APPLICATION TO COMMODITIES LAW
Genesis of the Suitability Doctrine
Securities law concepts, including the suitability doctrine, served as a
foundation for the regulatory proposals of the CFTC Advisory Committee.
The suitability doctrine has valid purposes when applied to the securities
industry, but its unaltered or inflexible application to the commodities
industry is unwarranted. A review of the suitability doctrine's foundation is
necessary in order to determine the proper scope of its application to the
commodities field.
The securities law suitability doctrine arises from the application to the
securities industry of certain rules of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, 31 the Securities and Exchange Commission32 and the New York
Stock Exchange. 33 The needs fulfilled by these rules are the need to verify the
customer's capital and the need to ascertain the customer's investment goals.
Section 2, article III of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice states:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange
of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for
believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer
upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to
his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and
needs.34
SEC rule 15b10-3 35 applies to broker/dealers who are not members of the
NASD. This rule contains basically the same provisions as the NASD rule but
also requires broker/dealers to make inquiry of a customer's financial
situation, needs and investment objectives if the customer himself fails to
provide adequate information.
These NASD and SEC rules have been interpreted as requiring two
separate and distinct determinations to be made by a broker/dealer prior to
recommending any securities to his customer. The broker/dealer must first
determine whether a security is worth recommending at all 36 and must then
31. Hereinafter referred to in the text as N.A.S.D.
32. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the SEC.
33. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the N.Y.S.E.
34. CCH NASD Manual, 2152 (1976).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1976).
36. This test is usually called the reasonable basis for recommendations doctrine. It would
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determine whether that security is suitable for a particular customer. The first
determination has come to be known as the "reasonable basis test" and
relates to the nature of the security rather than its appropriateness for a
particular customer. The latter determination is the province of the suitability
doctrine. 37 As in the case of many single-sentence doctrines, the suitability
''one-liner" opens a flood of unanswerable questions and difficult judgment
calls to be made by brokers.
Some of the problems the suitability test causes for broker/dealers
include obtaining private information from reluctant customers, deciding
how much information is to be obtained, and separating the relevant informa-
tion from the irrelevant. The broker/dealer's difficulties are magnified
because the regulatory agencies and courts have rarely faced, much less
resolved, the question of which specific standards should be imposed on the
securities industry in order to implement the broadly drawn suitability
doctrine. 38
NYSE rule 405(1), the "know-your-customer" rule, is commonly
applied as part of the suitability doctrine. It is similar to the NASD rule
described above and requires a broker/dealer to: "[u]se due diligence to learn
the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or
margin account accepted or carried by such organization and every person
be of little use in commodities law because a commodity underlying a commodity future need not
be investigated in the same manner as a relatively unknown company in the securities market
need be. The only need for investigation in the commodities field concerns the manner in which
various factors affect a commodity's supply and demand.
37. Cases which have illuminated the procedures to be used in satisfying the suitability
doctrine are Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970);
Blackburn v. Witter, 201 Cal. App. 2d 518, 19 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1962).
In Hecht the court held that excessive trading was unsuitable for the plaintiff's account. 283
F. Supp. at 437. It set forth the elements necessary to fulfill the suitability doctrine by referring to
publications of the NASD and the American Association of Stock Exchange Firms:
These publications indicate that good standard practice in the brokerage business
requires that a "partner" is obliged to know the "essential facts" relative to each
customer and to "supervise diligently" all accounts handled by registered representa-
tives to obtain the appropriate facts concerning each customer prior to opening the
account; that each time a new account is opened new information should be obtained
directly from the customer; that the investigation performed by the registered repre-
sentative should be a continuing one; that note of any changes in the customer's
financial status should be kept; that the registered representative should ascertain
whether the customer understands the basic mechanics of purchasing securities; that
representatives must know and keep themselves informed of circumstances relating to
their clients' interests which may have a bearing on the client's interests as investors'
and that a firm should not rely exclusively on a registered representative to obtain the
essential facts but should have a series of checks to determine that the full facts are
being obtained sufficiently to satisfy the firm's responsibilities.
Id. at 438.
38. Even if the broker is not required to make the absolutely correct determination of
suitability in all instances, he must still possess and apply the knowledge and use the skill and care
ordinarily used by well-qualified brokers under the same or similar circumstances. See, e.g.,
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, I.P.I.2d. CIVIL, Instruction 105.01
at 319 (1971).
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holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried by such
organization." 39 Rule 405(1) was originally intended to prevent stolen
securities from being sold through brokerage firms.' 0 Theoretically, if a
broker/dealer knew his customer, he would also know that the customer's
securities certificates came from legitimate sources.41
The Inapplicability of the Securities Doctrines to Commodities
Neither aspect of the suitability doctrine from securities law is applicable
to commodities futures trading. The "know-your-customer" prong of the
doctrine is not applicable because certificates of ownership are used in the
commodities industry only at the time of delivery of a commodity, not during
the trading process with respect to futures. Futures contracts are evidenced by
entries on the books of brokers and clearing houses with the customer
receiving confirmations of those purchases or sales. Since no document
representing the futures contract is ever issued, a customer has no fear of
having his futures contracts stolen.42 Thus, in commodities law, the absence
of the original purpose of the "know-your-customer" rule diminishes that
rule's relevance in this area.
The purpose of the broader "suitability rule" when applied to traders in
commodities is also of questionable relevance. One of the primary purposes
of the suitability doctrine is to protect the innocent customer who comes to a
broker/dealer for a low-risk investment program from being placed instead,
without his knowledge or full understanding, in a high-risk trading pro-
gram.43 The suitability rule is intended to prevent this abuse by requiring the
broker/dealer to obtain and to take into consideration in his recommendations
the customer's investment objectives and the reasonableness of these objec-
tives in light of his assets, liabilities and financial needs.
The wide range of trading objectives in securities includes trading in
conservative or secure issues. Many securities are rated and judged in
accordance with certain industry standards with ratings published by Standard
and Poor's and other services. *4 Some "safe" issues, such as government
bonds, are more suited to the objective of protecting or preserving capital.
39. [1976] 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2405.
40. See REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES & Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION 316, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1963); Comment, The
"Know Your Customer" Rule of the NYSE: Liability of Broker-Dealers Under the UCC and
Federal Securities Laws, 1973 DUKE L.J. 489.
41. Rule 405(1) has now expanded in scope to include the suitability doctrine.
42. See The Mechanics of Futures Trading, S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17
(1974).
43. See Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers-The NASD Suitability Rule,
51 MINN. L. REV. 233, 239-41 (1966).
44. Some of the most conservatively rated issues include government bonds and AA rated
issues such as A. T. & T. and General Motors bonds.
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Trading programs are available which can place either a large or small
proportion of low risk investments in the portfolios of a particular individual.
The predictability and assuredness of stock dividends and bond interest
payments are important to an investor who plans his financial program on
such income sources. Thus, the conservative investor who may buy securities
with the intent of holding them for long periods of time to receive dividends or
capital gains from an issue's growth has a multitude of possibilities for his
conservative investment plan.
In contrast, commodities trading cannot be considered an investment
vehicle and no options for conservative trading exist. The concept of holding
an issue for long-term profit on its growth is foreign to commodities trading
because of the short life of the commodities futures contract. And, although it
may be true that some commodities futures prices historically are more
volatile than others,'5 it is misleading from a trading point of view to conclude
that any particular futures contract can constitute a conservative purchase as
opposed to a risky one. Commodities trading inherently involves substantial
risk regardless of which contracts are traded.
The types of securities trading programs described above are totally
foreign to the nature of commodities speculation. Aside from hedgers,
commodities traders are speculators and all non-hedging commodities futures
trading should be assumed to be speculative. Speculators are not investors46
and cannot be presumed to be seeking the same objectives as an investor in the
securities market. While most investors desire price stability, speculators
desire price change. Conservative investors are interested in the long term
prospects of an issue and are therefore unconcerned with daily or weekly price
changes in the stock. Commodities speculators, on the other hand, must be
concerned with daily and even hourly price changes of futures contracts since
the mechanics of leverage trading translates slight price changes into signifi-
cant profits or losses.47 The speculator in commodities can never enjoy a
promise to pay a fixed sum on the part of the government or a major
45. For commodities which have highly volatile prices, see, for example, orange juice(frozen), Sept. 1976-N.Y. traded between August, 1975 and February, 1976, COMMODITY
RESEARCH BUREAU, INC., 21 COMM. CHART S. 15 (Feb. 13, 1976); lumber, March, 1976-Chicago,
traded between August, 1975 and February, 1976, id. at 14; cattle (feeder), May, 1976-Chicago,
traded between September, 1975 and February, 1976, id. at 4; potatoes (Maine), May, 1976-
N.Y., traded between May, 1975 and February, 1976, id. at 19; plywood, March 1976-Chicago,
traded between April, 1975 and February, 1976, id. at 17.
46. THE JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, S. REP. No.
1194, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33-44 (1974), sets forth important background information and data
which was considered by the Conference Committee in editing H.R. 13113. One interesting point
is the non-use of the hedger/speculator analysis and the questionable use of the word "in-
vestors" to describe customers of commodities brokers.
47. An adverse price change of several pennies realized on tens of thousands of bushels, for
example, may mean the loss of thousands of dollars to a speculator.
304 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
corporation. Insofar as he stands unsecured in bearing the risk of commodities
trading, his trading cannot be considered conservative.
The Committee's suggestion that "spread trades" may be an appropriate
vehicle for conservative traders is unsupported. 41 "Spreading" involves
simultaneously taking a long (purchase) position in one futures contract
against a short (sale) position in another futures contract. Spreading can be
conducted between commodities, between markets and between different
delivery months of the same commodity. 49 Because of what may be perceived
as a normal price relationship between commodities, delivery months or
markets, an excessive or diminished price difference signals a "spread trade"
opportunity to the spreader. The spreader is a speculator who, by entering a
simultaneous purchase of the relatively low priced commodity and a sale of
the relatively high priced commodity, seeks to make money as those com-
modity prices return to their normal or usual relationship.
Spreads are attractive to many persons because they involve reducing the
amount of a trader's money at risk on a given number of contracts. This
reduction results from the lower margin requirements established for spread
trades. 5° To the trader this means that by taking a spread position he has
lowered the capital committed to those contracts. 51 However, placing less
money at risk on a given contract is not the same as lowering the risk factors
inherent in trading commodities. Lowering one's risk relates to lowering the
possibility of loss while lowering the amount of money at risk relates to how
much capital is tied up. Because spread margins are lower than those required
for a speculator taking an outright position, a spread trader uses less of his
48. There are trading devices which can be used and if executed may assist in limiting loss
exposure. One such device is the stop loss order. This order is one placed by a person who holds a
position in the market. In order to protect against loss caused by an adverse price move, the trader
places an order to offset his positions should prices move against him. Assume, for example, that
a speculator has purchased 10,000 bushels of July corn futures at $2.10 pei bushel. In order to
protect his position against downward price movement, the trader might place a stop loss order to
sell 10,000 bushels of July corn at $2.00. If corn prices move down to $2.00 per bushel his order
will be executed and theoretically his loss will be limited to $. 10 per bushel. The same device is
easily employed to protect short positions by placing the stop loss order at an execution price
above the short price. The problem attendant to stop loss orders in a fast and volatile commodity
market is that the order may not get executed at the specified price. If a particular commodity is
experiencing "limit" price moves and no trading occurs, a trader may find his stops unexecuted
until trading resumes at price levels which have increased his loss. This is known as "blowing
through the stops," an event which surprises many new traders who have mistakenly determined
and fixed their potential loss exposure based on the stop loss price.
49. CBT MANUAL, supra note 6, at 113. The CFTC has included straddles and spreads
under the definition of "arbitrage." 7 U.S.C. § 6a (Supp. IV 1974).
50. Margins functions have been adequately described in The Commodities Game, supra
note 18, at 442: "Commodity exchanges set the minimum initial margin requirements and
maintenance margin levels for commercial and speculative accounts, but individual commission
houses may require margin deposits above the exchange's minimum level." See also CBT
MANUAL, supra note 6, at 128.
51. CBT MANUAL, supra note 6, at 125.
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resources to satisfy margin requirements. With more of his equity available
for margining uses, a spreader can increase the number of contracts for which
he is committed. If an outright speculator and a spread trader commit equal
amounts of capital to the margining of positions, neither has lowered the
amount of money at risk relative to the other and there may be increased rather
than lowered probability of loss for the spreader. 52 Successful spreading
depends primarily upon the accurate assessment of what price relationships
should be, as opposed to what they are when the trade is entered into. While
spreads may appeal to some speculators, the process of spread trading is
considered a sophisticated trading technique and is not recommended for the
beginning commodity trader. 53
The Committee's suggestion that spread trading, may be appropriate for a
conservative trader contains the misleading suggestion that the objectives of
some traders may be conservative. The concept is inapplicable. To the extent
spreading does entail lower per contract margin requirements, it does lower
the speculator's capital at risk. This should not be confused with lowering the
risk of loss.
Suitability standards for commodities speculators should be based on the
true premise of that marketplace: speculators are risk takers. Suitability to
trade can then be measured by one's risk-taking ability, which is a function of
one's liquid assets available for trading and possible loss in volatile markets. 54
The real suitability question to ask of a prospective commodities trader is
whether he should trade commodities futures at all. Unlike the securities
suitability standards, focusing on the recommendation of an appropriate
security to the investor, 55 commodities suitability should be concerned with
determining whether the speculator can maintain open positions in the market
before an adverse price change annihilates those positions.56 Because the
52. Another way to reduce one's money at risk is to trade smaller contract units as are
available on at least one Chicago exchange.
53. CBT MANUAL, supra note 6, at 125. "Skillful spreading requires a careful analysis of all
factors affecting the specific spread. . . [t]he spread must be seen in its historical and seasonal
context before the profitability of a change in a typical relationship between two futures prices
can be accurately evaluated."
54. Because speculators trade on margin, one can lose more than he puts up in the margin
pledge.
55. See notes 36, 37, supra.
56. The commodity trader does not have this question about trading mix. He knows all of
his purchases and sales are going to be speculative before he makes any move. His game is not
trading mix for he will deal in only two or three commodities at a time, changing his positions
often. He may trade wheat futures for several months, then switch to cattle, copper, or coconut
oil as prices fluctuate. He makes his money on the small percentage moves on the very large
positions he can control with his margin account. He expects to lose money on more than half his
trades but if he is a successful trader he keeps these losses extremely small and he is going to be
there for the major price moves either up or down. The commodity speculator is playing a game of
money management rather than trading mix. Which commodity he chooses is less important than
how he handles his account. GOULD, supra note 16, at 53.
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range of risk inherent in commodities futures trading is narrow, it is clear that
the traditional reasons for the application of the suitability doctrine in
securities law are inapplicable to commodities law and should not be the basis
of a suitability standard for commodities traders.
OTHER COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
Risk Disclosure Statement
One of the better recommendations the Committee has made is that of the
risk disclosure statement.5 7 As envisioned, this would be a written statement
given to the new commodities futures customer explaining the risks in trading
commodity futures. The statement would be directed primarily to the person
who is trading in commodity futures for the first time. Such a person,
especially if he has previously traded in securities, may tend to equate
commodities futures trading with securities trading without recognizing the
fundamental differences.
As the Committee appreciates, the risk disclosure statement should
inform the customer "that futures prices are subject to large and rapid
fluctuations; that the potential for profit (and loss) is directly related to the
degree of leverage; and that the same high leverage which creates the
potential for large profits can also lead to large losses." 58 The customer must
be made to understand how margin works, especially the fact that the amount
of margin is inversely proportionate to the an3ount of leverage and the
probability that the customer may be called upon to meet margin calls.
The mechanics of the commodity futures market must be explained to
the customer, emphasizing "daily price limits; the possibility of successive
days of limit trading; and the fact that successive limit days can vitiate
stop-loss orders." 59 Since these possibilities do not exist in the better-
publicized securities markets, a special effort should be made to ensure the
customer's understanding of these concepts. Otherwise, the broker may be
blamed if a new customer does not understand how he was caught on the
wrong side of a "limits down" market and could not liquidate his position
because he was "locked into" the market.
With such information clearly explained, the customer should begin to
understand that commodities futures trading is a highly speculative venture.
He must be told that the commodities futures market should only be for those
57. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.
58. Id. at 9.
59. Id. "Daily price limits" are those price limits set by the various exchanges, within
which trading can occur. If supply and demand dictate a real price beyond the limits for that day,
all trading stops. Trading resumes the next day with limits set around the close of the preceeding
day's preceding day's closing price.
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who are able to withstand substantial financial losses and that the majority of
new speculators lose money in the market. Finally, and most important, the
customer must be informed of the risk to his uncommitted capital.60 Because
of the low margin requirement, margin calls can be made with only a slight
variation in the price of the future, creating the possibility that the customer
may lose more capital than he originally put into the market. This fact alone
should warn the potential customer that speculators, not investors, belong in
the commodities futures markets. As has been recently stated in Geldermann
v. Lane,61 "[tihis [commodities trading] obviously is no business, game or
sport for the fainthearted or for those of limited financial resources."
The Committee proposes that the risk disclosure statement be a uniform,
one-page document.62 While undue complexity which might discourage the
potential customer should be avoided, the'document should clearly illustrate
all of the dangers involved in trading commodities futures. Assuming the
document is not couched in legalistic terms, two or three pages may not be too
much to expect a customer to read and digest.
A final but very important procedure is that "[tihe FCM should be
required promptly to obtain from the customer a written acknowledgement
that he has received the risk disclosure document. "63 This acknowledgement
should be received before any trades are made. One of its purposes is to ensure
that the risk disclosure statement is brought to the attention of the customer.
Bringing it to his attention, however, is insufficient; the customer must
also understand the contents of the risk disclosure statement. A few questions
directed to the customer by the broker may help determine this. Without the
prospective trader's full understanding, the risk disclosure statement is
worthless. When the customer understands the risk involved in commodities
futures trading, he can determine for himself whether he is suitable for
trading.
Minimum Customer Liquid Capital
One area of suitability which should remain the FCM's concern is that of
60. Id.
61. 527 F.2d 571, 578 (7th Cir. 1975).
62. ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 9-10. A precedent for such a docu-
ment can be found in prospectuses selling commodity futures funds. These prospectuses must
meet not only the adequate disclosure requirements of the SEC, but also the adequate and
accurate disclosure requirements of the Blue Sky laws. Even though a buyer cannot lose more
than he invested in these funds, the prospectuses still disclose the price fluctuations of the
commodity markets and the effect that small margins have on the leverage of the price.
63. Id. at 9. A rule similar to the one proposed is Chicago Board Options Exchange Rule
9.7, CBOE GUIDE (CCH) 2132 (1976), which requires a member organization to provide a
customer with a prospectus at or prior to the time the account is approved and to receive within
fifteen days of such time an agreement from the customer that his account will be handled in
accordance with the rules of the Exchange and the Clearing Corporation. In this instance the risk
disclosure statement was compiled by the various exchanges, not the SEC.
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the customer's financial situation. The small size of the margin required to
trade in commodities futures contemplates the possibility of a number of
margin calls in the future. In order to satisfy these a trader must have a ready
reserve of liquid capital. The FCM, both for its own protection and its
customer's, should be required to use procedures which confirm the existence
of a customer's liquid capital.
One possible rule for the CFTC to consider in this area is to require a
customer to have a minimum net worth before he is allowed to trade in
commodities futures.64 The Committee believes this to be undesirable,
curiously stating that "[a] customer's suitability to trade futures does not
depend on his net worth.' '65 As support the Committee remarks that com-
modities futures trading programs range "from the highly conservative to the
very aggressive. "66 This viewpoint ignores the fact that all commodities
futures trading is speculative and risky; investment programs can be found
only in the securities industry. Once the commodities futures trader is
recognized as the speculator he is, there is no need to be concerned with
traditional facets of the suitability doctrine. The only relevant aspect of the
financial suitability is the prospective trader's ability to withstand monetary
loss. The Committee's failure to recognize this results in its erroneous
conclusion that net worth is not a major factor to consider in determining
suitability to trade commodities.
The FCM should discover three things about his customer: (1) Whether
he is informed of the risks; (2) whether he desires to trade in commodity
futures; and (3) whether he is financially able to trade. The customer's desire
will become manifest only after full disclosure has been made to him
concerning the risks involved. The customer's ability can be ascertained by
requiring him to maintain a minimum liquid capital in reserve for margin
calls. What the FCM should not have to decide subjectively for his customer
is whether trading commodities futures is appropriate. This is the customer's
decision. To do otherwise would place the entire unnecessary burden of the
suitability doctrine on the FCM. Simply stated, if the cu.omer understands
64. Many state securities commissioners have seen fit to establish minimum standards for
prospective commodity fund purchasers. These funds are usually limited partnership arrange-
ments wherein purchasers buy one share in the venture and thereby limit their loss exposure to
the amount of their purchase. These funds offer no chance of the limited partner losing more than
he paid for his shares and in that way offer less exposure for the owners. The State of Illinois
Secuities Department in its statement of policy, for example, has determined as a guideline for
prospective buyers of commodity fund shares that:
Illinois residents warrant and represent that they have a net worth (exclusive of
home, furnishings and automobiles) of at least $75,000 or a net worth (similarly calcu-
lated) of at least $20,000 and non-taxable income of at least $20,000. The minimum
purchase (of shares) for Illinois residents is $5,000.
65. ADVISORY COMMiTrEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
66. Id.
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the risks involved, his trades should be limited only by his ability to meet the
next margin call.
Procedures to help the FCM determine this ability should be developed
by the commodities industry. The method chosen must not involve an
inordinate amount of paperwork. One possibility is to require a new customer
to obtain a bank letter of credit for a stated amount from a bank to use as
margin. Other procedures may develop through experiment. Although some-
what arbitrary, the minimum customer liquid capital rule provides a certainty
for the commodities industry which is lacking in the application of suitability
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Commodities trading is not an investment vehicle and is riskier than
securities speculation. The fact is that one can lose more than is put up in
"margin" pledge. Losses can eliminate all of the trader's uncommitted
capital in volatile commodity markets. Leverage and volatility combine to
make commodities trading a form of financial risk taking not meant for the
uninformed.
There is only one honest and objective standard to use in judging the
suitability of a prospective trader--does he have the capital to stay in the
game. If he does and if he understands the mechanics of the enterprise and the
risks involved, he can trade. Investor standards of suitability like the investor
himself, have no business in the commodity markets.
